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Monetary Lessons of Hong Kong
Many smail, open economies have responded to
the uncertainties associated with the introduction
of floating exchange rates in 1973 by linking the
value oftheir currency to that of a major currency
-likethe u.s. dollar, the Japanese yen, the Ger-
man mark-or to a basket of currencies. How-
ever, to the extent that a country attempts to keep
this linkage fixed through varying circumstances,
this approach limits its ability to pursue indepen-
dent monetary policy. Consequently, in practice,
most countries implement periodic adjustments
in the value of their currency, permitting some-
what more latitude in conducting monetary
policy than if the currency peg were permanent.
The members of the European Monetary Sys-
tem (EMS) are contemplating a step beyond such
"adjustable pegs:' Under the proposed plan to
move toward a common currency at some time
in the future, EMS members would in the mean-
time fix their exchange rates with each other
irrevocably, such that revaluations would not
be allowed. Nominally, each European country
would still have its own currency, but in effect
European central banks would surrender their
power to conduct independent monetary policy.
Money creation in each economy would then be
determined by the demand for each national cur-
rency at the permanently fixed exchange rates.
This situation would be similar to that of a coun-
try or a territory with its own currency but no
central bank.
There is little theoretical guidance on how a
monetary system of this nature would affect
individual European economies, but there is
one recent example of such a system: Hong
Kong during the five years from 1983 to 1988.
This Letter examines the lessons offered by
Hong Kong's experience.
Monetary control without a central bank
Most modern economies have established a
central bank to control their domestic money
supply, based on the belief that this is conducive
to improved macroeconomic performance in
both the short and long run. In the short run,
central banks may be able to playa role in
smoothing short-run domestic output fluctua-
tions, although, in practice, with varying degrees
of success. In the long run, central banks attempt
to prevent excessive money creation in order to
achieve long-run price stability and support sus-
tained economic growth.
In a regime without a central bank, money
creation is determined by the market. Theory
suggests that a monetary regime without a cen-
tral bank can still achieve long-run price stability,
provided that the monetary liabilities of the
banking sector are at all times fully convertible
with a stable major currency at a fixed exchange
rate. Hong Kong's monetary system from 1983 to
1988 qualifies as an example of such a system.
Hong Kong's system of monetary control has two
unique features. First, in the absence of a central
bank, currency in Hong Kong was and still is
issued mainly by the privately-owned Hongkong
and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HKSBC). To
issue currency, the HKSBC surrenders foreign ex-
change assets to the' government Exchange Fund
to purchase certificates of indebtedness, against
which it is authorized to issue Hong Kong dollar
notes. The HKSBC can exchange foreign ex-
change assets for these certificates at a fixed
exchange rate set by the government. (Since
1983, the exchange rate has been HK$ 7.80 per
U.S. dollar.) The Exchange Fund in turn stands
ready to exchange foreign assets for certificates
of indebtedness at the fixed exchange rate.
The second key feature of Hong Kong's monetary
control system is that banks do not hold reserves
with the government to settle interbank claims.
Instead, they hold deposits at the HKSBC, which
acts as the clearing bank for all interbank trans-
actions in Hong Kong. These clearing balances
can be exchanged for Hong Kong dollar notes
and vice versa.
These two aspects of Hong Kong's system mean
that liquidity within the banking system (that is,
currency and net interbank clearing balances),FRBSF
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conditions in Hong Kong, but the peg to a
fluctuating U.S. dollar.
In such a small, open economy, the impact
of these sharp fluctuations in the exchange rate
was substantial, and may have contributed to the
volatility in real GNP growth and inflation illus-
trated in the chart. Specifically, appreciation of
the Hong Kong dollar from 1983 to 1985 appears
to have contributed to an unprecedented reces-
sion in Hong Kong in 1985. The subsequent
sharp decline of the Hong Kong dollar appears
to have produced an undervaluation in the cur-
rency and a temporary economic boom. Eco-
nomic growth accelerated to an average pace
of nearly 13 percent in 1986 and 1987, compared








The Volatile Performance of
Hong Kong's Economy
During this boom, Hong Kong experienced large
speculative capital inflows on the expectation
that the government would allow the Hong Kong
dollar to appreciate by adjusting the peg. These
inflows were monetized as a result of the fixed
exchange rate. Money growth accelerated from
25 percent in 1985 to a peak of43 percent in
1987. Consequently, inflation rose from under
two percent in 1985 to close to 10 percent in
1989. The rise in inflation contributed to a loss
in competitiveness and a slowdown in the pace
of economic growth to 2.5 percent last year.
In a regime with more exchange rate flexibility,
the Hong Kong doiiar might have depreciated
against the u.s. dollar in 1983-85 and appreci-
ated against the U.S. dollar in 1985-87, limiting
the volatility in Hong Kong's growth and inflation
Adjusting to shocks
In the event of a purely monetary shock in
which there is an excess supply of or demand
for money, such a regime can readily restore
monetary equilibrium, in a manner similar to
the textbook description of the gold or gold-
exchange standard adjustment mechanism. .An
excess supply of money, for example, would put
downward pressure on the value of the Hong
Kong dollar, giving banks an incentive to redeem
notes for foreign currency (at the favorable ex-
change rate offered by the Exchange Fund) in
order to sell the foreign currency at a profit in the
market, thereby reducing the amount of currency
outstanding. If the incentive to acquire foreign
assets were sufficiently strong to prompt them to
exchange their clearing balances at the HKSBC
for foreign assets, clearing balances also would
be reduced. The oN'erall contraction in the money
supply would in turn tend to limit inflationary
pressures and preserve the fixed exchange rate.
Between 1983 and 1987, the U.S. doiiar first
appreciated and then depreciated, and the Hong
Kong dollar did likewise. In each case, the move-
ment in Hong Kong's currency did not reflect
Although monetary shocks can be managed by
Hong Kong's monetary regime, theory suggests
that a fixed exchange rate regime may amplify
the effects of real shocks on output and inflation.
These real shocks arise from changes in aggre-
gate demand or misalignment of the exchange
rate. Over the period under discussion, Hong
Kong was particularly vulnerable to exchange
rate misalignments caused by fluctuations in the
U.S. dollar that did not reflect changes in the
underlying fundamentals in Hong Kong.
as well as the rate of money (deposit) creation,
are both functions of the size of the liabilities of
the HKSBC. These arrangements for money crea-
tion under a fixed exchange rate have two impli-
cations. First, any domestic notes issued are fully
backed by foreign currency assets, and are there-
fore fully convertible at the fixed exchange rate
set by the government; this puts a limit on note
(and, therefore, money) creation. Second, without
central bank powers, the government has had
little ability to manipulate the money supply.
Instead, the market has determined the equilib-
rium supply of money at the fixed exchange rate,
based on preferences between foreign- and
domestic-currency assets.in the 1980s. However, the absence of a central
bank probably precluded greater exchange rate
flexibility. A clear and credible commitment to
a fixed exchangerate apparently underpins the
stability of Hong Kong's monetary regime. In
1982-83, uncertainty about the future of Hong
Kong triggered a speculative attack on the Hong
Kong dollar, which ended only when the govern-
ment established a credible exchange rate peg in
October 1983. Subsequent adjustments in the
peg, therefore, would have raised questions
about this commitment.
A central bank by any other name
Thus, rather than adjust the exchange rate, the
government was able to interrupt the speculative
shift into Hong Kong dollars over 1985-87 by
discouraging capital inflows. In November 1987,
the government announced a "negative interest
rate" scheme that would have penalized licensed
banks for their credit balances at the clearing
house and depositors for holding balances in
excess oU million Hong Kong dollars at licensed
banks. The scheme was never implemented, as
the mere announcement ended the upward
pressure on the Hong Kong dollar.
The negative interest scheme was the prelude
to a much more significant change: the end of
the system of passive money creation in Hong
Kong. Since July 1988, the HKSBC has been re-
quired to maintain a non-interest bearing Hong
Kong dollar account with the government Ex-
change Fund equal to the size of its net clearing
balance liability in the interbank market. The
HKSBC must pay an interest penalty if the bal-
ance in its account with the Exchange Fund
falls below the net clearing balance.
With th is change, the government can now
manipulate the money supply (and has done so
frequently since 1988) by influencing the level
of the HKSBC's account with the Exchange Fund.
For example, when the government wishes to
counter downward pressure on the Hong Kong
dollar, the Exchange Fund purchases Hong Kong
dollars from the HKSBC, thus drawing down the
value of the HKSBC's account with the Exchange
Fund and forcing the HKSBC to reduce the size
of the net clearing balance in the interbank
market. Since the government can, in effect
initiate changes in the money supply, Hong Kong
now has the near equivalent of a central bank
with powers to conduct discretionary monetary
policy if it wishes.
Lessons
The lessons offered by Hong Kong's experience
are mixed. It is apparent that an economy can
have a very satisfactory economic performance,
on average, even when the marketcontrols
money creation. Over the 1983-89 period, Hong
Kong's annual GNP growth averaged 7.3 percent,
among the highest in the world. Inflation, which
averaged 6.2 percent, was not excessively high
by world standards, although some other finan-
cial centers such as Singapore had much lower
inflation (around one percent) over the period.
At the same time, the costs of a monetary
regime with an inflexible peg can be significant.
Such a peg can lead to exchange rate misalign-
ment, large speculative capital flows, and vola-
tility in growth and inflation. In the absence
of a central bank, it is very difficult to correct
exchange rate misalignment because adjust-
ments in the peg tend to undermine the credibil-
ity ofthe monetary regime. The pressures created
by exchange rate misalignment appear to have
prompted Hong Kong to discourage capital flows,
and more recently, to assume central banking
powers to control the money supply. Similar pres-
sures may confront European economies in their
efforts to achieve currency unification.
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